

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 DHA-02
IO-13 AID-05 ACDA-07 SNM-02 DEAE-00 PC-01 EB-08
COME-00 AGRE-00 IGA-02 EUR-12 /102 W
-----271415Z 011782 /53

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1208

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 4194

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PK, US, PFOR,

SUBJECT: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. WITH THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THREE MAJOR CITIES AND THE ADOPTION THERE AND ELSEWHERE IN PAKISTAN OF A SERIES OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES INCLUDING SELECTIVE PRE-PUBLICATION CENSORSHIP, URBAN CURFEWS, ANY FURTHER ARRESTS OF OPPOSITION LEADERS, BHUTTO MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN FINDING A NEW FORMULA FOR HOLDING ON TO POWER. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL HOW LONG THIS SET OF ARRANGEMENTS CAN CONTAIN THE OPPOSITION CHALLENGE, OR INDEED WHETHER IT IS MEANT TO BE A HOLDING PATTERN DESIGNED TO BOLSTER BHUTTO'S BARGAINING POWER WHILE FURTHER EFFORTS ARE MADE TO FIND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS. MUCH OBVIOUSLY DEPENDS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MILITARY TO CONTINUE TO LEND ACTIVE SUPPORT TO THE REGIME, AND ON WHAT TERMS THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO SO. FOR THE MOMENT, ALL THAT CAN BE SAFELY SAID IS THAT BHUTTO'S MOST RECENT ACTIONS HAVE LED MANY OBSERVERS HERE TO REVISE THEIR EARLIER ESTIMATE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF OUSTER, AND TO BEGIN TO CONJECTURE THAT HE MAY CONTINUE IN OFFICE FOR SOME TIME.

2. IF HE SUCCEEDS IN DOING SO WITH ARMY SUPPORT, WHETHER IN THE
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ABSENCE OF ANY FURTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OPPOSITION OR IN THE COURSE OF PROTRACTED AND INTERRUPTED ONES, THE NATURE OF HIS GOVERNMENT WILL DIFFER FROM THAT OF HIS FIRST ADMINISTRATION. LARGE SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION WILL DENY ITS LEGITIMACY. ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE PM'S OPPONENTS MAY REMAIN SILENTLY ACQUIESCENT, OTHERS WILL PARTICIPATE IN SCATTERED OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. PARLIAMENT AND THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

WILL BE EITHER ONE-PARTY BODIES OR WILL COMPRISE OVERWHELMING PPP MAJORITIES SUPPLEMENTED BY CAREFULLY SELECTED "INDEPENDENTS" CERTAIN TO BE REGARDED AS STOOGES OF THE GOVERNMENT. MANY OPPOSITION LEADERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SYMPATHIZERS WILL REMAIN BEHIND BARS. THE PRESS IS LIKELY TO BE MUZZLED EVEN MORE FIRMLY THAN IT WAS BEFORE THE LIBERALIZATION WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF STRIKE AND ASSEMBLY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE. IN SHORT, BHUTTO, AWARE OF THE ANTAGOINISM MANY HAVE COME TO FEEL AGAINST HIM, HIS PARTY, AND HIS GOVERNMENT, AND FEARFUL THAT ANY RELAXATION WILL ONLY LEAD TO FURTHER TROUBLE, WILL KEEP THE LID TIGHTLY SCREWED ON, ENLISTING MILITARY SUPPORT TO DO SO. PAKISTAN MAY GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF SUPERFICIAL STABILITY, BUT THE SITUATION WILL BE BASICALLY UNSTABLE.

3. IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE BECOME MORE CERTAIN THAN WE ARE NOW ABOUT WHERE THE PAKISTAN POLITICAL CRISIS IS LEADING. IN THE MEANTIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN THE PM'S POLITICAL FORTUNES MAKES IT APPROPRIATE TO CHART OUT SOME INTERIM POLICIES FOR DEALING WITH THE POSSIBLE SITUATION OUTLINED ABOVE.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT DURING A PERIOD OF CONTINUING BUT POSSIBLY SHORT-LIVED BHUTTO GOVERNMENT WE SHOULD PURSUE POLICIES WHICH WILL KEEP IN VIEW OUR ENDURING LONG-TERM REGIONAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN QWKISTAN, SUCHH S AREA STABILITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS. IN ADDITION, WE DO NOT WANT THE PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS TO AFFECT NEGATIVELY OUR IMMEDIATE INTERESTS IN MANY FIELDS WHERE WE HAVE ONGOING PROGRAMS OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO US SUCH AS

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NARCOTICS, SHIP VISITS, POPULATION STRATEGIES, AND INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE NEITHER THE PM, HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS, NOR THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC TO CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE TAKING SIDES IN PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC CONFRONTATION. RUMORS OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION ARE SPREADING AND WE HAVE TAKEN FIRM EXCEPTION TO THESE CHARGES WITH THE GOP. THE FACT THAT SUCH RUMORS HAVE A READY AUDIENCE IN PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, STRENGTHENS OUR VIEW THAT WE SHOULD EXERCISE THE UTMOST CARE TO AVOID IDENTIFICATION - TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE - WITH EITHER SIDE IN THE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION. ESSENTIALLY THIS MEANS KEEPING THINGS ON AN EVEN A KEEL AS POSSIBLE, AVOIDING ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED POLICY, AND FOLLOWING A LOW-PROFILE, NON-"ACTIVIST" FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN. WE SHOULD GENERALLY CARRY ON WITH OUR PROGRAMS, BUT TAKE NO INITIATIVE WHICH CAN BE CONSTRUED AS EITHER BREAKING WITH BHUTTO OR OFFERING HIM RENEWED SUPPORT.

5. ARRIVAL OF THE AMBASSADOR. WITH AMBASSADOR BYROADE SCARCELY DEPARTED, SPECULATION ABOUT THE NEW AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL DATE

AND ITS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE AS AN INDICATOR OF USG ATTITUDES TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN HAS NOT YET BEGUN. THE PAKISTANI CAPACITY FOR FINDING MORE IN SUCH A SITUATION THAN MEETS MOST OTHER EYES IS WELL-KNOWN AND HAS BEEN RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED. UNDEER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE NEW AMBASSADOR ANNOUNCE HIS TRAVEL PLANS BEFORE SUCH SPECULATION GOES INTO HIGH GEAR AS IT MAY WELL WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD USE THE NEW AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL DATE AS A SIGNAL OF EITHER APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF THE BHUTTO

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1209

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 4194

GOVERNMENT. HAVING A NEW AMBASSADOR IN PLACE IN AS EXPEDITIOUS AND NON-CONTROVERSIAL A WAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IS IMPORTANT TO OUR INTERESTS HERE. DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE AS A MEANS OF SIGNALLING OUR CONCERN TO THE GOP IS NOT ONLY INADVISABLE BUT ALSO HAS THE OBVIOUS DRAWBACK THAT A LATER DECISION TO HAVE THE AMBASSADOR PROCEED TO POST FOR OTHER REASONS WILL BE SEEN AS A SIGNAL OF APPROVAL OF THE PM AND HIS ACTIONS.

WE ALSO DO NOT THINK HIS ARRIVAL SHOULD BE POSTPONED PENDING A RESOLUTION OF THE REPROCESSING QUESTION. IF WE DECIDE THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT TO PRESENT A PACKAGE TO THE GOP AND WE CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE FRENCH SIDE OF THE EQUATION, THE NEW AMBASSADOR CAN TELL THE GOP, IF IT ASKS, THAT OUR POSITION IS STILL BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS. DURING CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, THE NEW AMBASSADOR IS LIKELY TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE PAKISTAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN GENERAL, AND ABOUT THE GOP'S REPRESSIVE MEASURES IN PARTICULAR.

IF THE GOP'S RECORD ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS DOES NOT COME INTO SHARP FOCUS AT HIS HEARINGS, IT IS LIKELY TO BE REAISED AT THE DEPARTMENT IN SOME OTHER WAY, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT FREST REPRESSIVE MEASURES INCLUDING MARTIAL LAW AND THE ABROGATION OF THE JUDICIABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL RIGHTS IN

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THE MARTIAL LAW AREAS HAVE BEEN IMPOSED. WE BELIEVE OUR PURPOSES HERE COULD BE BEST SERVED BY RESPONDING TO THIS ISSUE ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN STATE 94253. WE WILL CLOSELY MONITOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND IF IT CHANGES SIGNIFICANTLY, WILL BE MAKING APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND AID. ACCORDING TO CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE AND DEPARTMENT POLICY, OUR AID PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED TO ASSIST PRIMARILY THE RURAL POOR AND ARE BASICALLY NOT TIED TO WHATEVER GOVERNMENT IE IN POWER. CONSEQUENTLY, FOR AID PROJECTS WHICH ARE ALREADY SIGNED AND MOVING TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION, WE SHOULD PROCEED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE POLITICAL CRISIS HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO ACCENTUATE BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS WITHIN THE GOP AND THE TRADITIONAL LASSITUDE WITH WHICH PAKISTANI BUREAUCRATS TACKLE VARIOUS PROBLEMS WILL BE STRENGTHENED. WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND AND WORK WITH THIS NEW SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND TRY TO ENSURE IT AFFECTS OUR ONGOING PROGRAMS AS SLIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE.

WE PLAN TO CONTINUE WORKING ON AID PROJECTS AND REVIEW THE SITUATION AS THE TIME FOR SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS ON EACH PROJECT APPROACHES. AS PART OF OUR STRATEGY IN THIS AREA, WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE GO AHEAD AS PLANNED WITH PL-480 PROGRAMS FOR THIS YEAR. FOR SIMILAR REASONS, WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND ANY CHANGE IN CCC PROGRAMS.

IF IT APPEARS THAT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED TEMPORARY, TO THE POINT WHERE SECTION 116 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT BECOMES APPLICABLE, WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THESE PROJECTS "DIRECTLY BENEFIT NEEDY PEOPLE" BEFORE PROCEEDING.

8. MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY. MILITARY SUPPLY IS A PRIME AREA WHERE WE SHOULD APPLY OUR POLICY OF NON-ACTIVISM WHILE AVOIDING DAMAGE TO OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE PAKISTAN MILITARY, ESPECIALLY AS IT MAY WELL BE PLAYING A MORE IMPORTANT

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POLITICAL ROLE IN THE COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME WE BELIEVE WE

SHOULD NOT NOW MOVE AHEAD ON CONTROVERSIAL SALES. UNDER OUR RECOMMENDED APPROACH, WE WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO DELAY ACTION ON THE GOP REQUESTS FOR A-7S, ATTACK HELICOPTERS, CLUSTER BOMB UNITS, AND HOWITZERS. THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN IN THE MILL FOR A LONG TIME AND LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE READ INTO FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF OUR DECISION. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR INTERESTS HERE, HOWEVER, THAT WE AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE RETURNING TO OUR PRE-FEBRUARY 1975 ARMS SUPPLY POLICY. FOR THIS REASON WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO PROCEED WITH NON-CONTROVERSIAL SALES CASES, AND WELCOME THE MESSAGE RECEIVED TODAY THAT WE ARE MOVING AHEAD WITH THE SALE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS, IF POSSIBLE, TO IDENTIFY AND PROCEED WITH AT LEAST ONE NON-CONTROVERSIAL CASE INVOLVING EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SOLD UNDER THE PRE-1975 POLICY BUT WHICH AT THE SAME TIME IS NOT PART OF A PACKAGE OF INDUCEMENTS WE HAVE ASSEMBLED IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPROCESSING NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, WE SHOULD CARRY ON WITH DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT SPECIFIED IN CONTRACTS ALREADY SIGNED.

9. VISITS. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, HIGH LEVEL VISITS OF USG OFFICIALS TO PAKISTAN SHOULD BE AVOIDED. ROUTINE JOURNEYS WITHIN A RECOGNIZED FRAMEWORK (E.G. CENTO) ARE UNOBJECTIONABLE. (WE EXPECT TO MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED AT THE CENTO MINISTERIAL IN TEHRAN.)

10. NON-PROLIFERATION. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE, AND SPECIFICALLY THOSE ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY, ARE POSITED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE WILL NOT BE MOVING AHEAD DURING THIS PERIOD WITH ANY PACKAGE OF POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS DESIGNED TO LEAD THE PAKS TO GIVE UP THEIR REPROCESSING DEAL WITH THE FRENCH. WE BELIEVE THAT DURING THIS SHORT-TERM PERIOD IT WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS OUR EFFORTS ON THE FRENCH. ASSUMING THAT THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO BE RELUCTANT TO MOVE FORWARD BECAUSE OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES IN

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PAKISTAN--UNCERTAINTIES WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST DURING THE PERIOD COVERED HERE--THERE WILL BE NO COMPELLING NEED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOP. TO DO SO, OF COURSE, WOULD ALSO BE TO PUT US INTO JUST THAT POSTURE WE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID, I.E. DEVIATING FROM OUR CUSTOMARY APPROACH AND THEREBY SENDING SIGNALS TO PAKISTAN.

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